Transformation of Islamic Political Movements in Indonesia in the Reformation Era

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Abstract
During the New Order era, there were only 3 political parties. After the New Order ended, proposals for the formation of political parties emerged. Before the 1999 elections were held, there were 181 political parties founded by various components of the nation. Of this number, 42 of them are Islamic parties. After passing the screening stage, only 48 parties were eligible and registered as participants in the 1999 elections, of which 20 were Islamic parties. Basic facts show that an important shift has occurred in Indonesia, namely a shift from state to political society, from bureaucrats to politicians. An equally dramatic change was the emergence of the da'wah movement and political Islam as the main force that attracted attention after being on the fringes of state power for so long. This research aims to determine the characteristics of Islamic parties, the history of Islamic politics, and the transformation of Islamic politics in the Reformation era. The research results show that the initial concept of a group changes, following the flow of local politics, but in fact it is a tool to achieve its goals and mission. Joining the Islamic group does not mean forgetting or abandoning its initial goals but could be an opportunity to gain wider public sympathy for the organization's expansion. There are strong indications of the emergence of symptoms of "post-Islamism" in the Islamic movement in Indonesia as an implication of globalization. This means that the opportunity for the "post-Islamism" movement to strengthen is also quite strong in Indonesia. The main characteristic of the post-Islamism movement is their pragmatic, realistic tendency, willing to compromise with political realities that are not completely ideal and in accordance with the pure ideological scheme that they believe in and imagine.

Keywords: party, political, ideological, Islam, post-Islamism.

Abstrak
Pada masa Orde Baru, partai politik hanya ada 3. Setelah Orde Baru berakhir, usulan pembentukan partai politik bermunculan. Sebelum Pemilu 1999 digelar, tercatat sebanyak...

Kata kunci: partai, politik, ideologis, Islam, post-Islamisme.

Introduction

Since the collapse of the New Order regime at the end of May 1998, the political climate in Indonesia has been open to various political experiments. The aspirations that were suppressed and manipulated in such a way when the New Order came to power regained their space for articulation. Before the reform took place, there were only two political parties and one work organization (Golkar) which became the regime's political machine. The government effectively forced all political elements to join these three organizations so that the government could freely control, and even suppress, several potentially oppositional elements. As a result, political struggles based on differences in ideologies, sects and class solidarity which were the fundamental pillars of Old Order politics were no longer the basis for common struggles during the New Order era (Suryadinata, 1978).
The New Order government attempted to eliminate ideological conflict by creating a political order whose main goal was to realize a model of statehood that Karl D. Jackson called Bureaucratic Politics (Jackson & Pye, 1978). In this model, the power of political institutions outside the government such as parliament, political parties and interest groups is weakened and limited in such a way. Participation in public decisions is almost entirely carried out by state institutions and all their apparatus such as civil servants, especially officers and bureaucrats, including highly educated specialists known as technocrats.

The state succeeded in co-opting existing political and social institutions, enabling it to establish solid legitimacy. In the case of Political Islam, the state limits its development through systematic politics of alienation, while still encouraging worship-oriented and social Islam (Benda, 1980).

Muslim political leaders who aspire to replace Islam in the mainstream of national politics have failed. Political Islam is placed in an equal position with communism through the classification of extreme right for political Islam and extreme left for communism. The extreme right is a stigmatization given by the New Order government to identify political Islamic movements, or at least the potential to move in that direction, from both radical and moderate circles. Muslim politics is considered to have the potential to give rise to national chaos because of its denial of the most basic identity of Indonesian nationalism, namely the diversity of religion, ethnicity and culture of its population (Mulkan, 1994).

The post-New Order political landscape brought several important changes, including the restructuring of the state system and national politics. Political sectors outside the state are allowed to develop. People from various groups were given the freedom to establish political parties, including establishing Islamic parties (Dhakidae, 1999; Evans, 2003). Before the 1999 elections were held, there were 181 political parties founded by various components of the nation. Of this number, 42 of them are Islamic parties. Even
after passing the screening stage carried out by Team Eleven of the Department of Home Affairs, only 48 parties were eligible and registered as participants in the 1999 Election, of which 20 were Islamic parties.

Observing the dynamics of the development of political parties above, it can be concluded that a basic fact is that an important shift has occurred in Indonesia, namely a shift from state to political society, from bureaucrats to politicians. The state is no longer the main actor and the only one who determines Indonesia's future political formulation. Non-state forces, Civil Society and Political Society, have gained reputation and trust to carry out fundamental changes for the realization of an open and democratic society (Lay, 2006). An equally dramatic change was the emergence of the da'wah movement and political Islam as the main force that attracted attention after being on the fringes of state power for so long. Political Islam, which has experienced marginalization, has now found legal space to become an actor in da'wah and political movements. This research aims to determine the characteristics of Islamic parties, the history of Islamic politics, and the transformation of Islamic politics in the Reformation era.

**Characteristics of Islamic Political Parties**

In its development, the use of Islam in politics took a number of forms or styles of expression which were conditioned by local socio-political realities as well as by Islamic beliefs.

The ideology of Islamic political activists is a product of faith and experience, a religious philosophy that is interpreted and applied in the context of a particular country or region. This then explains the diversity of Islamic movements, actors, organizations, ideological approaches and methods. Thus, Islamic alternatives vary markedly from one country to another and one organization to another. Islamic organizations and movements reflect a diversity of forms of Islam, rather than a unified form, ranging from moderate, carried
out within existing governments, to violent revolutions, which seek to overthrow existing regimes, from open to secret membership, from relatively democratic to totalitarian (Karim, 2016).

From the perspective of social movement theory, the success of a movement in holding collective actions against great powers will be closely related to the presence of political opportunities rather than social and economic factors. One way to understand the Islamic phenomenon of the modern era seems to be more helpful if it is seen as a system of values and teachings and as a social reality (Azra, 1996). As a system of values and teachings, Islam is divine and therefore transcendent. As a social reality, Islam is a civilization and cultural phenomenon in human life. Islam and social reality are not only a number of universal and contextual doctrines, but also manifest themselves in social institutions which are influenced by the situation and dynamics of space and time. Contemporary phenomena show that Islam today has manifested itself in history. This historical reality has become the view that Islam is a religion that is also closely related to statehood. Therefore, it is not surprising that when Muslims became acquainted with Persian Aryanism, there was a popular expression that said "al-Islam din wa dawlah", that Islam is a religion and a state (Karim, 2016).

This manifestation takes two forms, namely as an ideal transcendental religious system and as a historical reality. As for its first form, Islam is reflected by Islamic sciences as a result of the interpretation of scholars and scholars of the Qur'an and the example of the Prophet Muhammad. As a historical reality, Islam is reflected by Islamic culture, civilization and society. This phenomenon is part of the embodiment of Islam in political dynamics. The journey of Islam, especially political Islam, which is represented through Islamic political parties, as well as cultural Islam as opposed to political Islam which usually carries out its activities through non-political channels. The indicators used to see the
position of political Islam are Islamic symbols, Islamic doctrine, Islamic institutions, policies, Islamic actors. Islamic Dynamics.

According to him, the meaning of 'Islam' means the liberation of human consciousness from tyrannical forces. Even though Islam generally means "submission", this meaning has been manipulated by the elite to become "submission" to the authorities as an implementation of submission to God. Therefore, Hanafi places greater emphasis on other meanings of the word "Islam", namely "protest, opposition and revolution" (Karim, 2016).

From this perspective, Islam is widely seen as more than just a religion, giving rise to several forms of Islamic activism which are often called Islamism. In the Muslim world, almost all Islamic movements have placed ideology in a very important position and function. Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jama'at Islam in Pakistan, and Islamic movements in Indonesia such as Syarikat Islam and Masyumi, were born and cannot be separated from ideology (Karim & Mamat, 2012).

A view that links Islam as an ideology, in the sense of Islam as a comprehensive religion involving all aspects of life including politics and projects Islam directly or integrally with political or state life. Islamic groups are reviving (Karim & Mamat, 2013). Islamization must be carried out through direct involvement in social and political activities. For Islamists, involvement in politics is based on Islam as a general and comprehensive system of thought (Islam is a global and synthesizing system of thought), Islamic society in its various foundations and structures of life must be Islamic (Hilmy, 2011).

Reformation Period Political Parties

Zainal noted that reform encouraged the political enthusiasm of the Islamic ummah which was manifested in the establishment of Islamic-based political parties. In countries in the transition stage towards democracy, the existence of political parties is increasingly significant. As O'Donnell and
Schmitter concluded from their study of democratic transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe, political parties play a role in restoring previous political systems and carrying out political transformation in a broader context. In the early stages of a transition, parties may have only a small stake or no role at all. Those who played a role in this period were professional associations, social movements, student movements, labor unions, religious groups, intellectuals and artists (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1993). So many Islamic organizations have emerged, such as the Mujahideen Council, Hizbut Tahrir, the Committee for the Enforcement of Islamic Sharia (KPPSI), and others outside of Islamic political parties who are raising the issue of returning to the Jakarta charter and implementing Islamic law with Islamic symbols and attributes (Effendy, 2003).

In just a few months after the reforms began, Indonesia had more than 170 parties. Parties that use religious labels are already in the 50s, including Islamic parties. However, through the verification process, only 48 parties were deemed worthy of participating in the election. Although in the end, in the 2014 general election, the number of parties in Indonesia narrowed back to 12 and almost half of them were parties with an Islamic ideology or at least had an Islamic mass base.

PKB was born from the womb of the largest religious organization in Indonesia, namely NU. In the last few decades, the Soeharto NU regime withdrew from the practical political arena by focusing its movement on social areas. However, the post-Soeharto political situation encouraged the nahdliyyin community to provide maximum political participation so that from the NU base at least four political parties were born, namely PKB, PNU, PKU and the SUNI party. Among the four parties, PKB has a more strategic position because it was officially born by PBNNU, so it is the most representative representative of NU's return to the political stage. These historical ties give PKB a clear constituent base in areas that have long been NU pockets. Moreover, PKB was
founded by Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), a figure known to have wide associations and influence. Gus Dur's leadership opened up the possibility for PKB to attract support from various outside groups.

Muhamadiyah was not left behind, namely the founding of PAN (National Mandate Party) even though it was not an Islamic party, its mass base was Muhammadiyah members. It appears that this was established when, on 5-7 July 1998, Tanwir Muhammadiyah was held in Semarang, which was attended by the central leadership of Muhammadiyah as well as delegates from regional (provincial) levels throughout Indonesia. During the meeting, the important point of the decision was that Muhammadiyah form a new party as a forum for channeling the aspirations of its citizens. One of the founding figures was Amin Rais (Rais, 1989).

Among other more radical Islamic parties such as PKS, PPP and PBB, Islamic symbolization is still carried out massively, but the goal of establishing an Islamic state has also been ignored. They prefer pragmatic and realistic political steps by entering the existing political system to gain greater access in the decision-making process without abandoning Islamic principles. Other issues such as improving the economy, education, eradicating KKN and democratization seem to attract more interest.

Transformation of the Islamic Political Party Movement during the Reformation Period

In the Indonesian context, the phenomenon of political Islamic movements occurs in the area of meaning at the level of implementation of issues and symbols. Political Muslims believe that it must be realized symbolically in politics, while substantive Muslims oppose the presence of Islamic parties and the symbolization of Shari’ah by the State. Substantive or liberal Islamic circles (mostly young people who joined JIL) rejected all forms of struggle that wanted to legalize Islam in politics. For this group, efforts to
symbolize sharia will threaten integration and at the same time pollute the true meaning of religion. Mixing religion with politics is not only wrong and wrong, but religion is simply used as a tool to achieve the political interests of the elite. On the other hand, those who fight for sharia (formalization/symbolization) believe that Islam is an integrative religion, Islam does not recognize separation between religion and state, between this world and the hereafter and separation in any form. According to this group, those who want this separation are secular (Jurdi, 2008).

This is the impact of the reform era which brought political liberalization. This situation has allowed the birth of a very large number of political parties. Among the political organizations that emerged were parties that had Islamic social origins. Political parties are starting to "find their momentum" again to attract the public. Religious symbols are starting to become "commodities" again which are considered capable of increasing vote acquisition. As a continuation of such social origins, there are parties that assert themselves as Islamic parties.

This is especially visible in the party's symbols and principles. There are also those who feel there is no need to declare themselves as an Islamic party. Despite this, the public still considers it an Islamic party. This is in accordance with the existing reality, that clearly the supporters of these parties, whether they are officially declared Islamic parties or not, are the Islamic community.

The failure of Islamic parties to win the first elections in this reform era had a serious impact on the figures and leaders of Islamic parties. Their hope of assuming the reins of national leadership seems difficult to achieve. In general, it could be said that there was demoralization within the Islamic parties after the 1999 elections. However, this condition did not last long, the Islamic parties agreed to form a coalition by taking the momentum of polarized political support to elect the President between Habibie (Golkar Party) and Megawati (PDIP). By forming the Central Axis, they played the Islamic issue and card
by nominating Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) as an alternative presidential candidate. After going through very interesting political twists and turns and political dynamics, and after Habibie's Accountability Speech was rejected by the MPR, Gus Dur was elected as the 4th President of the Republic of Indonesia on October 20 1999 (Liddle, 2000).

Previously, Akbar Tanjung was elected as Chairman of the DPR (People's Representative Council) and M. Amien Rais was elected as Chairman of the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly). When Gus Dur was elected President, echoes of Badr's takbir and prayers were heard in the MPR building (Fealy, 2003). At that time, many said this was the victory of Islam and the era of the Indonesian government being held by Islamic students. The era of the ruling Islamic boarding school gave new hope to Islamic parties to be able to take part and have a bright political future in Indonesia. The era of glory for Islamic parties on the stage of power apparently did not last long. Not long after Gus Dur became President of the Republic of Indonesia, conflict occurred between Islamic figures and the Islamic parties themselves. After the conflict became increasingly heated and irreconcilable, Gus Dur was finally impeached by the MPR through a Special Session in 2001. The impeachment movement against Gus Dur was carried out by the Central Axis minus PKB coalition together with the PDI Perjuangan and the Golkar Party. So, as stated by Azyumardi Azra, Gus Dur's rise and fall was actually sponsored by the Islamic Party and mainstream Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah (Azra, 2006).

The rise of Megawati as the 5th President of the Republic of Indonesia by joining Hamzah Haz as Vice President shows the successful return of the Islamic Party to the national political stage. As expressed by Rizal Sukma, these political facts show that Islam has played an important factor in the political system and succession in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Islamic politics is also
becoming increasingly taken into account on the national political stage (Sukma, 2003).

In the 2004 elections, the Golkar Party emerged as the winner by obtaining 21.6% of the vote, followed by PDIP 18.5%, and the Democratic Party 7.45%. Meanwhile, the total number of other small parties was 17.3%. 13 Even though in the 2004 elections Islamic parties did not emerge as winners, almost all Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates paid attention to Islamic sentiments and issues as an important factor. Almost all candidates are trying to form a coalition between Islam and Nationalists. If the presidential candidate is from an Islamic party or Muslim circle, then the vice president is from the nationalist circle, and vice versa. Even though Islamic factors influenced Indonesian politics from 1999 to 2004 and after that almost all Islamic parties entered the circle of power since the era of Gus Dur, Megawati and SBY, the results of the 2009 elections were not as they expected. In fact, the 2009 election was the saddest election for Islamic parties. In that election, the total vote for Islamic parties was the worst compared to the 1955 election (44%) and the elections that followed. If in the 2004 elections they obtained 41%, their votes dropped drastically to only 29.2 percent in 2009. 14 What is even more ironic is that only 4 Islamic political parties managed to pass the parliamentary threshold (vote threshold in parliament) in the 2004 elections, namely: PKS, PAN, PKB, and PPP (Fanani, 2013).

This condition further strengthens many previous opinions that even though the majority of the Indonesian people are Muslim, this fact does not have a positive correlation with the level of electability of Islamic parties. Apart from that, the increasing expression of Islam among Indonesians, especially after 1998, through many channels such as economics, spirituality, culture and politics, as explained by Greg Fealy and Sally White, does not seem to have had much influence on the party's vote share.
In the Islamic context, this development has given rise to its own assessment, namely the view regarding the re-emergence of Islamic political power. This view is considered acceptable, because one thing that must be remembered is that the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim. Directly or indirectly, this reality will have political implications. In other words, any political force, especially political parties, will really take into account such demographic realities. This means that the Islamic masses will be contested by political forces in order to seek support. Although in certain areas, articulation (Islamic political thought) is still dominated by an ideological desire to legitimize the regimes of Islamic society today (Effendi, 2001).

If we look at the series of developments in post-reform Islamic parties, it seems that apart from the view that increasing Islamization or santrinization in Indonesia is not positively correlated with an increase in the vote share of Islamic parties, there are other political facts that are also occurring. The political fact is that even though the Islamic Party came to power from the 1999 to 2019 elections. The figure factor is still supporting the PKB as a basis for the Nahdlatul Ulama period to be able to jump into the top 3 because it is influenced by the vice president, namely KH. Ma'ruf Amin, it's not just the party's performance. This is exemplified by the PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) which supports President Prabowo and Sandiaga uni with an Islamic form of various attributes which is unable to increase the party's overall vote.

Table 1 Islamic party vote acquisition

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>10,71%</td>
<td>8,15%</td>
<td>5,32%</td>
<td>6,53%</td>
<td>4,52%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>1,94%</td>
<td>2,62%</td>
<td>1,79%</td>
<td>0,79%</td>
<td>0,79%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>1,36 %</td>
<td>7,34%</td>
<td>7,88%</td>
<td>6,79%</td>
<td>8,21 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>12,61%</td>
<td>10,57%</td>
<td>4,94%</td>
<td>9,04%</td>
<td>9,69 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7,4%</td>
<td>9,6%</td>
<td>7,7%</td>
<td>8,8%</td>
<td>6,85%</td>
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The above reality seems to emphasize that religious phenomena have always accompanied the history of politics in Indonesia. It started on June 22, 1945 when the Committee of Nine succeeded in formulating a draft preamble (preamble) to the Basic Law which contained Pancasila. This design was later named by Mr. Moehammad Yamin as the Jakarta Charter or the Jakarta Charter where the First Principle states Belief in God with the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its adherents. Apart from that, in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution there is a paragraph which reads "By the grace of Allah the Almighty and driven by a noble desire to live a free national life, the Indonesian people hereby declare their independence." This sentence is an expression of the conscience of the Indonesian people which was expressed before the Proclamation of Independence, so it can be called the Declaration of Indonesian Independence (UGM, 2003).

The two examples above further emphasize that politics in Indonesia is always surrounded by religious nuances. This means that there is a religious spirit that is built within a framework to accommodate and appreciate other religions, especially those that have existed since Indonesia was still in the kingdom era. Historically, the phenomenon of religion in political life emerged when the 1955 elections were about to be held. At that time, parties with religious labels emerged, such as the Masyumi Party, the Sarekat Islam Indonesia Party and the Catholic Party.

In fact, when the first post-independence elections were held, non-religious parties won 61 percent of the votes in representative institutions, Islam controlled 30 percent and Christian-oriented parties 0.29 percent. This means that even though the majority of the Indonesian nation is Muslim, it does not necessarily mean that Islamic parties get significant votes. Strengthening the selection of Islamic parties is influenced by figures who do not necessarily have the Islamic label.
Conclusion

Issues in the mission of Islamic activism (Ideological Islam) are increasingly widespread, not only in the realm of religion and politics, social, cultural and economic factors are also included. In the end, the identity of Islamic groups, especially those with roots in transnational networks, can now be said to have undergone a change in identity. The identity then changes when the group exists in one country, this is influenced by the local political system of that country. The initial concept of the group changed, following the flow of local politics, but in fact it was a tool to achieve its goals and mission. Joining the Islamic group does not mean forgetting or abandoning its initial goals but could be an opportunity to gain wider public sympathy for the organization's expansion.

In general, the shift in orientation of several Islamist movements above, if we borrow from Asef Bayat's discourse, is a strong indication of the emergence of symptoms of "post-Islamism" in Islamic movements in Indonesia as an implication of globalization. This means that the opportunity for the "post-Islamism" movement to strengthen is also quite strong in Indonesia. The main characteristic of the post-Islamism movement is their pragmatic, realistic tendency, willing to compromise with political realities that are not completely ideal and in accordance with the pure ideological scheme that they believe in and imagine. The general characteristics of post-Islamism everywhere are the same: compromise with political reality, pragmatism in implementing government programs, and a tolerant attitude towards different groups.

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